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The live poultry trade is thought to play an important role in the
spread and maintenance of highly pathogenic avian influenza A
viruses (HP AIVs) in Asia. Despite an abundance of small-scale
observational studies, the role of the poultry trade in disseminat-
ing AIV over large geographic areas is still unclear, especially for
developing countries with complex poultry production systems.
Here we combine virus genomes and reconstructed poultry trans-
portation data to measure and compare the spatial spread in China
of three key subtypes of AIV: H5N1, H7N9, and H5N6. Although it
is difficult to disentangle the contribution of confounding factors,
such as bird migration and spatial distance, we find evidence that
the dissemination of these subtypes among domestic poultry is
geographically continuous and likely associated with the intensity
of the live poultry trade in China. Using two independent data
sources and network analysis methods, we report a regional-scale
community structure in China that might explain the spread of AIV
subtypes in the country. The identification of this structure has the
potential to inform more targeted strategies for the prevention
and control of AIV in China.
avian influenza | poultry trade | phylogeography | community-structured
transmission
H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus (HP AIV)was first identified in 1996 (1). In the following two decades,
it has circulated among various bird species and spread to more
than 60 countries (2). Domestic poultry are thought to play an
important role in the transmission and spread of H5N1 HP AIV
and the virus’s ability to occasionally infect humans means it poses a
significant public health risk (3, 4). Human infection with H5N1 HP
AIV results in an estimated fatality rate of 50 to 60% (5), and most
cases are linked directly or indirectly to exposure to live poultry (4).
Maintenance of the virus in domestic poultry hosts has enabled
further virus evolution and the emergence of novel influenza viruses
of avian origin. H5N1 HP AIV emerged in part from the adapta-
tion of low-pathogenicity AIVs from waterfowl to domestic poultry
hosts (6). More recently, two novel reassortant H5 AIV subtypes,
H5N6 and H5N8, have emerged in Asia (7, 8); the latter subtype
subsequently spread to Europe, North America, and Africa, causing
outbreaks in local poultry (9). However, the mechanisms by which
these viruses disseminate and cause repeated large-scale waves of
infection in domestic poultry remain unclear.
Previous studies have explored the association between AIV
transmission and the trade in live poultry and associated poultry
products, but empirical data on transmission dynamics are
scarce. Although many retrospective epidemiological studies
have assessed common risk factors for AIV disease outbreaks,
comparatively few have include poultry trade patterns, which are
considered difficult to obtain (10). Some studies (11–13) have
attempted to infer poultry trade networks at the local level by
summarizing the routes of traders among live poultry markets
(LPMs), and have concluded that poultry trade patterns are as-
sociated with AIV outbreaks. Other studies have investigated
AIV genome sequences using Bayesian phylogeographic meth-
ods (14, 15) and have found that poultry population density and
the number of poultry markets are determinants of the spatial
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diffusion of AIVs in endemic areas (16). However, it can be
difficult to infer underlying transmission processes from such
data due to the uneven sampling of virus genomes through time
and space, and a reliance on passive surveillance means that
many virus lineages may go unsampled. The paucity of data on
the poultry trade and variable virus genome sampling therefore
combine to hinder our understanding of the factors that facilitate
the dissemination of H5N1 and other AIV subtypes over large
geographic scales, especially in countries with high volumes
of poultry production and trade sectors that are not strongly
regulated (17).
Here we combine poultry trade movements (inferred using a
gravity model) in China with large-scale analysis of AIV genome
sequences in order to reconstruct hidden virus transmission
routes and test the hypothesis that the live poultry trade in China
affects the spread of HP AIV in the country. We reconstruct the
estimated transmission dynamics in China of HPAI H5N1 from
1996, and compare them with the dynamics of other, more re-
cently emerged, HP AIV lineages. We find that AIV trans-
mission patterns can be explained by a national-level community
structure of the poultry trade network in China. Our results
provide insights into the large-scale structure and repeatability of
AIV lineage emergence in Asia and may be useful in predicting
the emergence of other AIV strains in other regions.
Results
The Spread of H5N1, H7N9, and H5N6 in China. The hemagglutinin
(HA) gene phylogenies of AIV subtypes H5N1, H7N9, and
H5N6 in China exhibit frequent virus lineage movements among
locations, indicating substantial geographic mixing (SI Appendix,
Fig. S1). Taking H5N1 as an example, a discrete phylogeographic
analysis of HPAI H5N1 in Chinese poultry revealed many well-
supported viral lineage movements among provinces (as pre-
viously noted in ref. 16). In addition to this general pattern, we
Fig. 1. Spatiotemporal dissemination of AIV subtypes H5N1, H5N6, and H7N9 among poultry in China, determined by Bayesian phylogeography inference of
HA gene sequences. (A, C, and E) Curves show the among-province virus lineage transitions statistically supported with Bayes factor >3 for subtypes H5N1 (A),
H5N6 (C), and H7N9 (E). Curve widths represent transition rate values; curve colors represent corresponding statistical support (Bayes factor value) for each
transition rate (Inset). (B, D, and F) Among-province virus lineage transition rates (supported with Bayes factor >3) decrease with geodesic distance between
provinces for subtypes H5N1 (B), H5N6 (D), and H7N9 (F).
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further observed that lineage movements occur between pairs of
provinces that are adjacent or close (Fig. 1A). Consequently,
lineage transition rates between locations are inversely related to
distance, suggesting a more geographically continuous process of
virus spread in poultry in China (Fig. 1B). This pattern is con-
sistent for all three AIV subtypes (Fig. 1). However, some long-
distance movement events were also observed, notably to or
from the northern provinces of Jilin, Xinjiang (H5N1 and
H7N9), and Ningxia (H7N9 only). Since virus sequences are
unavailable for many of the provinces that directly neighbor Jilin,
Xinjiang, and Ningxia, it is possible that AIV is present but
underreported in these intermediate locations, and that virus
movements occur over shorter distances.
Since all three AIV subtypes in Chinese poultry exhibited evi-
dence of a continuous process of geographic spread, we sought to
test which variables might be associated with AIV lineage move-
ments in China, with the aim of informing prevention and control
of the disease. To do so, we employed a Bayesian phylogeographic
approach that uses a generalized linear model (GLM) to quantify
the contribution of predictor variables to the among-province
lineage transition rates. This method was applied to HA se-
quences from the three independent AIV lineages in China:
H5N1, H7N9, and H5N6. To begin, we used the established
procedure of considering all potential predictors concurrently.
This analysis revealed that many potential predictors are not as-
sociated with viral lineage movement (SI Appendix, Figs. S2 and
S3). Based on the results of fully specified models, with and
without distance, and sensitivity analysis (SI Appendix, Fig. S4), we
recomputed these phylogeographic analyses using a much smaller
set of predictors, specifically those that have been hypothesized by
others to affect the large-scale dissemination of AIV (6, 8, 16, 18):
1) the intensity of the poultry trade among locations in China, 2)
the migration of wild birds among locations in China, and 3)
distances along the road network in China (see Methods for de-
tails). Although minimum road distance is strongly inversely as-
sociated with the dissemination of AIV lineages across a range of
model configurations (Fig. 2A), it is likely that this predictor is
simply acting as a proxy for the spatial distance component of the
other two predictors. Since our primary hypothesis relates to the
linkage of the poultry trade network and the wild bird migration
network to AIV dissemination in China, we excluded the mini-
mum road distance predictor from the previous exploratory
analyses (Fig. 2B). We found that for all three subtypes (H5N1,
H7N9, and H5N6), the live poultry trade network is positively
associated with viral lineage spread, although this association is
considerably less certain for H5N1 than for the other two subtypes
(Fig. 2B). In contrast, the wild bird migration network is associ-
ated only with dissemination of H5N1 in China and not with the
other two subtypes (Fig. 2B). The robustness of this result was
confirmed using a model that directly compares the model in-
clusion probability of the wild bird migration and poultry trade
predictors (SI Appendix, Table S1). Following these results, sub-
sequent network analyses of these independent datasets were
undertaken to explore how the AIV diffusion process is shaped by
the structure of the live poultry trade network.
Effect of LPTC Structure on the Spread of AIV in Poultry in China. The
analysis above found that the poultry trade network in China can
predict the risk of AIV lineage spread from one location to
another, especially for the H7N9 and H5N6 subtypes. Thus, the
epidemiological consequences of viral introduction and spread
should depend on the structure of the poultry trade network at
the national scale. To understand and quantify this structure, and
to identify subnational poultry trade communities, we used a
Walktrap algorithm to estimate a maximal-modularity subdivision
of the poultry trade network in China (Fig. 3). This procedure
identified five live poultry trade communities (LPTCs), that cor-
respond spatially to the south (LPTC-1), east (LPTC-2), northeast
(LPTC-3), midnorth (LPTC-4), and west (LPTC-5) of China (Fig.
3). The LPTC community structure is robust to perturbation
(Dataset S1). This result indicates that transmission of AIV line-
ages in China may be community-structured, such that virus dis-
semination between localities within a community is more likely
than dissemination among communities.
In order to assess whether the transmission of AIV lineages
belonging to all three subtypes are indeed associated with poultry
trade communities in China, we undertook new discrete Bayes-
ian phylogenetic analyses of the HA sequences belonging to AIV
subtypes H5N1, H7N9, and H5N6. In these phylogeographic
analyses, sequence locations were encoded using the five LPTCs.
The LPTCs recapitulate important events in the phylogenetic
history of all three subtypes (Fig. 4). The H5N1 subtype initially
became enzootic in southern China (LPTC-1) (19), and major
clades subsequently spread to southeastern China (LPTC-2) and
midnorthern China (LPTC-4) (20) (Fig. 4A). A similar pattern of
community-structured circulation was observed for H7N9 and
H5N6 (Fig. 4 B and C). Originating from southeastern China
(LPTC-2), H7N9 viruses diverged into two monophyletic groups,
the Yangtze River Delta lineage and the Pearl River Delta
lineage (21), which coincide with LPTC-2 and LPTC-1 in our
LPTC network. H7N9 AIV has circulated in these regions for
more than three years, causing epidemic waves I through IV
(22). However, in epidemic wave V, H7N9 was found to have
spread from LPTC-1 to all other LPTCs in China (22). For
H5N6, most monophyletic groups of viruses have circulated
Fig. 2. Contributions of predictor variables to the dissemination of H5N1,
H5N6, and H7N9 lineages in poultry in China, determined from analysis of
HA gene sequences. (A) Results when the minimum road network distance
predictor is included in the analysis. (B) Results when the minimum road
network distance predictor is excluded from the analysis. AIV subtypes H5N1,
H5N6, and H7N9 are shown as blue, green and red, respectively. (Left) Circles
show the estimated conditional effect sizes for the predictor coefficients
(>0 = positive association, <0 = negative association). Error bars represent
the 95% highest posterior density (HPD) credible interval for these esti-
mates. (Right) Bars show the posterior probability of inclusion of each pre-
dictor in the model.
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regionally within LPTC-1 and LPTC-2 (7), although AIV lineage
movements among LPTCs are increasing (Fig. 4C).
We performed two subsequent analyses to explore whether the
LPTCs explain the dissemination of AIV in China. First, we
examined the estimated among-province lineage transition rates
(i.e., those reported in Fig. 1 for all three AIV subtypes). We
found that transition rates between provinces in the same LPTC
(H5N1 mean = 1.08; H5N6 mean = 1.06; H7N9 mean = 1.07)
were on average higher than those for provinces in different
LPTCs (H5N1 mean = 0.98; H5N6 mean = 0.98; H7N9 mean =
0.97). Second, we conducted a randomization test in which lo-
cations (i.e., provinces) were randomly assigned to five com-
munities (with the same number of members as our empirical
LPTCs). For each randomly generated community (RGC), we
calculated the mean within- and among-community lineage
transition rates between locations (as above). This randomiza-
tion procedure was repeated 1,000 times. As expected, in the
randomly generated communities there was no difference be-
tween the mean transition rate for location pairs in the same
community versus the mean transition rate for location pairs in
different communities (Fig. 5). The results in Fig. 5 demonstrate
that the LPTC in Fig. 3 does indeed contribute to the pattern of
AIV lineage movement in China.
The subnational community structure identified above, which
was estimated from the inferred live poultry trade network,
provides a framework to evaluate AIV dissemination during
outbreaks. However, available AIV genome sequence data from
China is not obtained in a structured manner at the national
level; hence, few or no genomes are available from some prov-
inces. In order to explore further whether a reliance on conve-
nience sampling hinders our understanding of AIV transmission
and spread, we utilized a virus gene flow network (GFN) model
that is capable of exploring virus transmission paths through both
sampled and unsampled locations (SI Appendix, Fig. S5). The
GFN model generates measures of virus gene flow among lo-
cations that can be directly compared with the poultry trade
network reported above. We find that the virus gene flow net-
work closely matches the structure of the live poultry trade
network (i.e., Fig. 3). In both the live poultry trade network (SI
Appendix, Table S2) and the gene flow network (SI Appendix,
Table S3), we identified provinces that acted as hubs (Anhui,
Henan, Hubei, and Hunan) by calculating the in-degree and out-
degree of nodes. These hubs, located toward the center of the
country and linking adjacent communities, may play a significant
role in virus transmission among the five region-level commu-
nities. However, the structure of the virus gene flow network (SI
Appendix, Fig. S5C) is notably different from that of the poultry
egg trade network (SI Appendix, Fig. S6).
Discussion
The prevention and control of avian influenza in China relies
critically on an understanding of its mode of geographic spread
(23). Here, we undertook a series of analyses that combined AIV
gene sequences from poultry in China with data on the live
poultry transportation network in the country. Standard phylo-
geographic analyses revealed evidence that AIV subtypes in
domestic poultry have spread between geographically proximate
locations (most likely along national highways), and indicated
that the level of trade in live poultry is an important contributor
to the dissemination of three AIV lineages. We then used geo-
graphic modeling of the poultry trade network to identify five
live poultry trade communities that represent the large-scale
structure of the poultry trade in China, and confirmed the rel-
evance of this structure to AIV spread in China using two
complementary approaches.
Community-structured transmission of avian influenza means
that viruses are more likely to originate from, and migrate to,
other localities that belong to the same community during AIV
outbreaks. The spatial scale of the communities we have iden-
tified is regional; that is, they are subnational but larger than
individual provinces. Prevention and control efforts should
therefore take into account this regional structure and aim to
disrupt the movement of live poultry between source and sink
locations. Further, to prevent potential AIV introduction into
unaffected but high-risk localities, it is important to assess the
position of potential recipient locations within the community
structure (19, 23). For example, previous work described the
spread of H7N9 viruses between the Yangtze River Delta region
and the Pearl River Delta region (21); our results also predict the
Fig. 4. Spatial dynamics of H5N1, H5N6, and H7N9 AIVs. LPTCs 1 through 5
are shown in blue, magenta, purple, mustard, and green, respectively. (A)
Maximum clade credibility trees of the H5N1 virus isolated from poultry in
China. (B) Maximum clade credibility trees of H5N6 virus isolated from poultry
in China. (C) Maximum clade credibility trees of H7N9 virus. To illustrate a
wider geographical distribution of H7N9, we used 444 HA sequences of H7N9
viruses isolated from poultry, the environment, and humans in China.
Fig. 3. Estimated poultry trade among provinces and inferred subnational
communities in the poultry trade network in China. The gray/black curves
represent the accessibility of live poultry trade flows between pairs of
provinces. Light gray and dark gray curves represent low and high accessi-
bility flows, respectively. Provinces are colored according to the subnational
live poultry trade community structure, identified using the Walktrap
community-finding algorithm. LPTC = live-poultry trade community. The five
communities are shown in blue, magenta, purple, mustard, and green,
respectively.
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possibility of AIV spread from the Pearl River Delta region to
western China, and from the Yangtze River Delta region to
northern and western China, via domestic poultry transportation.
This finding is confirmed by the wider geographic spread of
H7N9 in wave V (22).
Although we found evidence for continuous geographic viral
spread among poultry populations in China (Fig. 1), few studies
of the spread of AIVs by wild birds at the intracontinental scale
(i.e., the contribution of migratory flyways) have found an effect
of geographic distance (18, 24, 25). This might result from the
qualitatively different movement patterns of migratory birds and
domestic poultry. Wild birds migrate between wintering and
breeding sites, making several stopovers along their flyway where
they can transmit AIV to local waterfowl (26), mammals (27),
and the environment (28). Locations that do not act as wintering,
breeding, or stopover sites have a low chance of virus introduction.
For this reason, viral lineage movement via bird migration may
exhibit discrete jumps over large distances, as observed for the
recent global spread of H5N8 (8). In contrast, domestic poultry is
transported along railroads or national highways within a country
(17, 29), and therefore AIV dissemination in domestic poultry
may follow a more continuous pattern of spatial spread (17, 29).
These differences likely reflect the roles played in AIV trans-
mission by different hosts, with domestic poultry spreading AIVs
at regional scales and migratory birds facilitating intercontinental
dispersal over large distances (30).
It is difficult to exclude the potential impact on AIV dispersal
of interspecies transmission between wild bird and domestic poultry
populations (Fig. 2). We attempted here to focus on transmission
dynamics among poultry by reconstructing interspecies trans-
mission events and removing virus lineages dominated by se-
quences from wild birds (SI Appendix, Materials and Methods).
However, the success of this approach (SI Appendix, Fig. S7) may
be affected by the underrepresentation of AIV genetic diversity
coming from wild birds. In China, domestic poultry are sampled
more intensively than wild birds and samples from wild birds are
concentrated in only a few locations, such as Qinghai and Hong
Kong. Thus, active surveillance of both domestic poultry and
wild birds is needed for a better understanding of AIV dispersal
dynamics in the country. We also directly compared the ability of
empirical wild bird migration and poultry trade networks in
China to explain AIV lineage movement, using Bayesian phy-
logeography inference with a GLM extension. We found that
wild bird migration may be weakly associated with H5N1 virus
dissemination in poultry but not associated with the spatial
spread of H5N6 and H7N9 subtypes. This is consistent with the
observation that most H5N6 and H7N9 strains to date are mainly
circulating in domestic poultry, human, and environmental
samples in China rather than in wild birds. We acknowledge two
additional caveats. First, although we have proved the feasibility
of using a gravity model to reconstruct the live poultry trade
network and have found a live poultry trade network that could
explain the observed gene flow, uncertainties between the gravity
model and disease spread (31) still exist and should be addressed
in future work. Second, even though we have tried to avoid the
limits of multiresolution modularity and have demonstrated
community structure robustness (Dataset S1, Fig. 5, and SI Ap-
pendix, Figs. S8–S10), we note that the detected LPTCs are not
unique; that is, there is no unique way to define the best partition
of a network.
In conclusion, we report a national-level community structure
of the poultry trade network in China and its association with the
spread of all three major AIV lineages in poultry in the country.
Further quantitative and qualitative insights into the network of
the live poultry trade and AIV in China will benefit the devel-
opment of strategies for AIV prevention and control.
Materials and Methods
Detailed information describing materials and methods is provided in
SI Appendix.
Sequence Data. We accessed HA gene segment sequences of H5N1 AIVs
sampled from 1996 to 2014 from the GenBank database, and obtained HA
gene segment sequences for H7N9 and H5N6 AIVs sampled from 2013 to
2017 from the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) da-
tabase. In order to focus on virus dissemination among poultry, it was first
necessary to exclude from the viral phylogenies those chains of AIV trans-
mission that derive from interspecies transmission events and occur in wild
bird populations. This was achieved by reconstructing the movement of AIV
lineages between wild birds and domestic poultry using a range of sampling
and analysis strategies. AIV sequences belonging to phylogenetic clusters
that were determined to represent transmission wholly or predominately in
or from wild birds were removed from the datasets (SI Appendix, Fig. S7),
which means that poultry AIV sequences found within clades dominated by
wild bird AIV sequences were also excluded. Consequently, only those line-
ages determined to be circulating in domestic poultry populations were
retained for further analysis. In order to ameliorate potential sampling
biases, we subsequently randomly subsampled these datasets in a stratified
manner to create a more equitable spatiotemporal distribution of AIV se-
quences (SI Appendix, Fig. S11). A strong phylogenetic temporal structure
was detected in all datasets (SI Appendix, Fig. S12).
Phylogeographic Inference. Time-measured phylogenies were inferred using
the Bayesian discrete phylogeographic approach (14) implemented in the
Bayesian Evolutionary Analysis Sampling Trees (BEAST) program, version
1.8.2 (32). We used an uncorrelated lognormal (UCLN) relaxed molecular
clock model (33), the SRD06 nucleotide substitution model (34), and the
Gaussian Markov random field (GMRF) Bayesian skyride coalescent tree prior
(35). We used Bayesian stochastic search variable selection (BSSVS) to de-
termine 1) the most probable locations of ancestral nodes in the phylogeny
and 2) the history and rates of lineage movement among locations (14). To
ensure that the relationships between distance and lineage movement were
not a consequence of the prior used, we repeated the analysis after ran-
domizing the locations assigned to each sequence (SI Appendix, Fig. S13).
Fig. 5. Histograms of mean among-location AIV lineage transition rates.
The raw transition rates between locations were obtained from the analyses
reported in Fig. 1. Shown are two means: blue = mean transition rate for
pairs of locations in LPTCs; red =mean transition rate for pairs of locations in
the same LPTC. Dotted vertical lines show the two means calculated using
the empirically derived (true) LPTC network (Fig. 3). The histograms show the
same mean values, calculated using 1,000 RGCs (see Methods for details).
Results shown for (A) H5N1, (B) H5N6, and (C) H7N9.
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To determine potential explanatory factors associated with AIV dispersal
among poultry in different locations, we applied the GLM extension of
Bayesian phylogeographic inference (15) to the HA gene datasets of the
H5N1, H5N6, and H7N9 viruses in China.
Poultry Transportation Network Reconstruction. Province-level networks of
poultry transportation (Fig. 3 and SI Appendix, Fig. S6) were constructed
from statistics of poultry egg production and populations of domestic
poultry, using a classic gravity model. This model is supported by cross-
sectional surveys of poultry transportation in Cambodia (36) and Vietnam
(37). In summary, the flux of live poultry or poultry egg transport (Gij) be-
tween provinces i and j separated by geographic distance dij takes the form
Gij = NiNjdij
−1, where Ni is the number of live poultry (unit: 10,000 poultry) or
the amount of poultry egg production (unit: ton) in source province i (av-
eraged across years) and Nj is human population size (unit: 10,000 people) in
destination province j (averaged across years). Other gravity-model param-
eterizations were tested, and the results showed that the network structure
we determined is robust to the parameterization.
Community Structure Detection. Identifying community structures (38) is a
crucial step in investigating networks that might explain patterns of viral
spatial dissemination. In this context, a community is a group of nodes in a
network such that intragroup connections are stronger or more numerous
than intergroup connections (39, 40); the degree to which a network is
subdivided into communities is measured as modularity (40). Using the
Walktrap community-finding algorithm (41), with random walk length t = 5,
we identified the community structure of 1) the live poultry trade networks
and 2) the poultry egg trade network. Several community detection
methods were compared (SI Appendix, Figs. S14 and S15), and the results
indicated that current methods were appropriate for our study.
Data Availability. HA gene segment sequences are available in the GenBank
(www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genome/viruses/variation/flu/) and GISAID (platform.
gisaid.org/) databases (Dataset S2). Socioeconomic data are available in
statistical yearbooks (SI Appendix, Table S4).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. Funding for this study was provided by the Beijing
Natural Science Foundation (JQ18025); the Beijing Advanced Innovation
Program for Land Surface Science; the National Natural Science Foundation
of China (81673234, 31822055); the Shenzhen Science and Technology
Research and Development Project (JCYJ20180504165549581); VIROGENESIS
(officially, Virus Discovery and Epidemic Tracing from High-Throughput Meta-
genomic Sequencing), which receives funding from the European Union’s Ho-
rizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement
number 634650; the UK Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) One Health
Poultry Hub; the National Key Research and Development Program of China
(2016YFA0600104); and the Young Elite Scientist Sponsorship Program (YESS)
by China Association for Science and Technology (CAST) (2018QNRC001); the
European Union Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant
agreement no. 725422-ReservoirDOCS). Partial support for the study was
provided by the National Institutes of Health (U19 AI135995); the Youth
Innovation Promotion Association of the Chinese Academy of Sciences
(2017122). H.T. and O.G.P. acknowledge support from the Oxford Martin
School. P.L. acknowledges support from the Research Foundation–Flanders
(Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek–Vlaanderen; G066215N, G0D5117N,
G0B9317N). H.T. acknowledges support from the Military Logistics Research
Program. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis,
decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
1. X. Xu, K. Subbarao, N. J. Cox, Y. Guo, Genetic characterization of the pathogenic
influenza A/Goose/Guangdong/1/96 (H5N1) virus: Similarity of its hemagglutinin gene
to those of H5N1 viruses from the 1997 outbreaks in Hong Kong. Virology 261, 15–19
(1999).
2. WHO/OIE/FAO, H5N1 Evolution Working Group, Toward a unified nomenclature
system for highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (H5N1). Emerg. Infect. Dis. 14, e1
(2008).
3. R. G. Webster, Wet markets–A continuing source of severe acute respiratory syn-
drome and influenza? Lancet 363, 234–236 (2004).
4. M. D. Van Kerkhove et al., Highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1): Pathways of
exposure at the animal-human interface, a systematic review. PLoS One 6, e14582
(2011).
5. World Health Organization, Cumulative number of confirmed human cases for avian
influenza A(H5N1) reported toWHO.World Health Organization. https://www.who.int/
influenza/human_animal_interface/2017_04_20_tableH5N1corrected.pdf?ua=1. Ac-
cessed 2 May 2017.
6. D. Normile, Avian influenza. Are wild birds to blame? Science 310, 426–428 (2005).
7. Y. Bi et al., Genesis, evolution and prevalence of H5N6 avian influenza viruses in
China. Cell Host Microbe 20, 810–821 (2016).
8. S. J. Lycett et al.; Global Consortium for H5N8 and Related Influenza Viruses, Role for
migratory wild birds in the global spread of avian influenza H5N8. Science 354, 213–
217 (2016).
9. World Organization for Animal Health, Update on avian influenza in animals (type H5
and H7). https://www.oie.int/animal-health-in-the-world/update-on-avian-influenza/.
Accessed 18 September 2017.
10. M. Gilbert, D. U. Pfeiffer, Risk factor modelling of the spatio-temporal patterns of
highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAIV) H5N1: A review. Spat. Spatio Temporal
Epidemiol. 3, 173–183 (2012).
11. V. Martin et al., Risk-based surveillance for avian influenza control along poultry
market chains in South China: The value of social network analysis. Prev. Vet. Med.
102, 196–205 (2011).
12. R. J. Soares Magalhães et al., Associations between attributes of live poultry trade and
HPAI H5N1 outbreaks: A descriptive and network analysis study in northern Vietnam.
BMC Vet. Res. 6, 10 (2010).
13. R. J. Soares Magalhães et al., Live poultry trade in southern China provinces and
HPAIV H5N1 infection in humans and poultry: The role of Chinese new year festivities.
PLoS One 7, e49712 (2012).
14. P. Lemey, A. Rambaut, A. J. Drummond, M. A. Suchard, Bayesian phylogeography
finds its roots. PLOS Comput. Biol. 5, e1000520 (2009).
15. P. Lemey et al., Unifying viral genetics and human transportation data to predict the
global transmission dynamics of human influenza H3N2. PLoS Pathog. 10, e1003932
(2014).
16. L. Lu, A. J. Leigh Brown, S. J. Lycett, Quantifying predictors for the spatial diffusion of
avian influenza virus in China. BMC Evol. Biol. 17, 16 (2017).
17. K. Bingsheng, H. Yijun, “Poultry sector in China: structural changes during the past
decade and future trends” in Poultry in the 21st Century: Avian Influenza and be-
yond. Proceedings of the International Poultry Conference, O. Thieme, D. Pilling, Eds.
(Food and Agriculture Organisation, Rome, , 2008), pp. 85-117.
18. H. Tian et al., Avian influenza H5N1 viral and bird migration networks in Asia. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 112, 172–177 (2015).
19. K. S. Li et al., Genesis of a highly pathogenic and potentially pandemic H5N1 in-
fluenza virus in eastern Asia. Nature 430, 209–213 (2004).
20. H. Tian et al., Spatial, temporal and genetic dynamics of highly pathogenic avian
influenza A (H5N1) virus in China. BMC Infect. Dis. 15, 54 (2015).
21. T. T. Lam et al., Dissemination, divergence and establishment of H7N9 influenza vi-
ruses in China. Nature 522, 102–105 (2015).
22. S. Su et al., Epidemiology, evolution, and pathogenesis of H7N9 influenza viruses in
five epidemic waves since 2013 in China. Trends Microbiol. 25, 713–728 (2017).
23. H. Chen et al., Establishment of multiple sublineages of H5N1 influenza virus in Asia:
Implications for pandemic control. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 103, 2845–2850 (2006).
24. M. Fourment, A. E. Darling, E. C. Holmes, The impact of migratory flyways on the
spread of avian influenza virus in North America. BMC Evol. Biol. 17, 118 (2017).
25. T. T. Y. Lam et al., Migratory flyway and geographical distance are barriers to the
gene flow of influenza virus among North American birds. Ecol. Lett. 15, 24–33 (2012).
26. J. Cappelle et al., Risks of avian influenza transmission in areas of intensive free-
ranging duck production with wild waterfowl. EcoHealth 11, 109–119 (2014).
27. V. S. Hinshaw, R. G. Webster, B. C. Easterday, W. J. Bean Jr, Replication of avian in-
fluenza A viruses in mammals. Infect. Immun. 34, 354–361 (1981).
28. K. Domanska-Blicharz, Z. Minta, K. Smietanka, S. Marché, T. van den Berg, H5N1 high
pathogenicity avian influenza virus survival in different types of water. Avian Dis. 54
(suppl. 1), 734–737 (2010).
29. L. Q. Fang et al., Environmental factors contributing to the spread of H5N1 avian
influenza in mainland China. PLoS One 3, e2268 (2008).
30. J. Bahl et al., Ecosystem interactions underlie the spread of avian influenza a viruses
with pandemic potential. PLoS Pathog. 12, e1005620 (2016).
31. A. Wesolowski et al., Impact of human mobility on the emergence of dengue epi-
demics in Pakistan. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 112, 11887–11892 (2015).
32. A. J. Drummond, M. A. Suchard, D. Xie, A. Rambaut, Bayesian phylogenetics with
BEAUti and the BEAST 1.7. Mol. Biol. Evol. 29, 1969–1973 (2012).
33. A. J. Drummond, S. Y. Ho, M. J. Phillips, A. Rambaut, Relaxed phylogenetics and
dating with confidence. PLoS Biol. 4, e88 (2006).
34. B. Shapiro, A. Rambaut, A. J. Drummond, Choosing appropriate substitution models
for the phylogenetic analysis of protein-coding sequences. Mol. Biol. Evol. 23, 7–9
(2006).
35. V. N. Minin, E. W. Bloomquist, M. A. Suchard, Smooth skyride through A rough sky-
line: Bayesian coalescent-based inference of population dynamics.Mol. Biol. Evol. 25,
1459–1471 (2008).
36. M. D. Van Kerkhove, “H5N1/highly pathogenic avian influenza in Cambodia: Evalu-
ating poultry movement and the extent of interaction between poultry and hu-
mans,” PhD thesis, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, London (2009).
37. G. Fournié et al., Investigating poultry trade patterns to guide avian influenza sur-
veillance and control: A case study in Vietnam. Sci. Rep. 6, 29463 (2016).
38. M. Girvan, M. E. Newman, Community structure in social and biological networks.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 99, 7821–7826 (2002).
39. F. Radicchi, C. Castellano, F. Cecconi, V. Loreto, D. Parisi, Defining and identifying
communities in networks. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 101, 2658–2663 (2004).
40. M. E. Newman, M. Girvan, Finding and evaluating community structure in networks.
Phys. Rev. E Stat. Nonlin. Soft Matter Phys. 69, 026113 (2004).
41. P. Pons, M. Latapy, Computing communities in large networks using random walks. J.
Graph Algorithms Appl. 10, 191–218 (2006).
6 of 6 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1906954117 Yang et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
at
 R
O
YA
L 
VE
TE
RI
NA
RY
 C
O
LL
EG
E 
on
 M
ar
ch
 1
0,
 2
02
0 
